> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://glide-9da73dea.mintlify.app/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Tool reference

> Every MCP tool exposed by apps/mcp — read, write, treasury endpoints. Input schemas, output schemas, money-safety F-rule contract.

All 22 tools at MCP v1 GA. Each handler lives in `apps/mcp/src/tools/<tool>.ts`.

Format per tool: `name · scope · category · annotations`. Full input/output schemas in the source file.

## Write tools (`/write` endpoint, 60 req/min cap)

| Tool                | Scope               | Annotations                                                            |
| ------------------- | ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `payments.initiate` | `payments:initiate` | destructive · idempotent · requires human approval (step-up threshold) |
| `payments.simulate` | `payments:simulate` | read-only · idempotent (dry-run)                                       |
| `cards.issue`       | `cards:manage`      | idempotent                                                             |
| `cards.freeze`      | `cards:manage`      | idempotent (already\_frozen is no-op)                                  |
| `beneficiary.add`   | `beneficiary:write` | requires human approval (principal multisig-proposal gate)             |
| `transfer.schedule` | `payments:initiate` | idempotent · policy re-eval at execute time                            |
| `payroll.run`       | `payments:initiate` | destructive · requires human approval · V2-dep-flagged                 |
| `x402.pay`          | `x402:pay`          | destructive · idempotent · F1 server-fetch tx verify                   |
| `x402.receive`      | `x402:receive`      | read-only (endpoint metadata describe)                                 |

## Read tools (`/read` endpoint, 300 req/min cap)

| Tool                | Scope                                                      |
| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
| `accounts.list`     | `accounts:read`                                            |
| `accounts.balance`  | `accounts:read`                                            |
| `transactions.list` | `accounts:read`                                            |
| `agents.list`       | `agents:read`                                              |
| `skills.list`       | `agents:read`                                              |
| `audit.stream`      | `audit:stream` (mints SSE cursor — `idempotentHint=false`) |

## Treasury tools (`/treasury` endpoint, 10 req/min cap)

| Tool                  | Scope                     | Notes                                                      |
| --------------------- | ------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
| `agent.budget.create` | `agent:budget:create`     | saga with 4-step rollback; requires human approval         |
| `agent.budget.revoke` | `agent:budget:revoke`     | destructive · auto-sweep on by default                     |
| `agent.grant.issue`   | `agent:budget:create`     | step-up required; refuses scope escalation                 |
| `vault.rotateSigner`  | `treasury:rotate-signer`  | step-up required; bumps policy\_version                    |
| `yield.allocate`      | `treasury:yield-allocate` | V3-dep-flagged; envelope step-up respected                 |
| `killSwitch.all`      | `agent:budget:revoke`     | destructive · emergency · `confirm_scope` literal required |

## Step-up flow (shared)

Write/treasury tools over the envelope return JSON-RPC `-32003` with:

```json theme={null}
{
  "code": -32003,
  "message": "amount 60000 requires step-up approval",
  "data": {
    "reason_id": "step_up_required",
    "step_up_url": "https://app.glide.co/step-up/<sigil>"
  }
}
```

Surface the URL to the user. They biometric-approve on the Glide sheet. Retry the tool with `step_up_sigil=<sigil>`. CAS-claim guarantees first-use-only; a 5-minute grace window returns the same payload to benign polls (prevents re-asking on network retry).

## Annotations honored by MCP clients

Per MCP 2025-11-25 spec:

* `readOnlyHint`: no side effects.
* `destructiveHint`: cannot be undone by the tool itself.
* `idempotentHint`: safe to retry with same params.
* `openWorldHint`: interacts with external systems (x402.pay, facilitators).

Glide extension:

* `requiresHumanApproval`: client SHOULD surface the step-up flow to the user even before calling.

Official Glide clients (Claude Desktop, ChatGPT Apps, Vertex) verify emitted annotations match the client-side registry; mismatch = refuse to execute. Custom runtimes that bypass this client-side check are still caught by the server-side annotation check on each call.